Starting from the seminal work of Volpano and Smith, there has been growing evidence that type systems may be used to enforce confidentiality of programs through non-interference.
Introduction
Type systems are popular artefacts to enforce safety properties in programming languages. They are also increasingly being used in the context of mobile code to enforce security policies. For example, it is natural to assign to program variables a security level that stipulates its confidentiality status (such as secret or public), and to guarantee that programs do not leak secret information through execution. The absence of information leakage can be made precise with non-interference, as defined in the work of Goguen and Meseguer [2] , and can be enforced via information flow type systems [3] .
Such information flow type systems have been thoroughly studied in the literature, see e.g. [1] for a survey. However, most works focus on high-level calculi, including λ-calculus, see e.g. [4] , π-calculus, see e.g. [5] , and ς-calculus [6] , or high-level programming languages, including Java [7, 8] and ML [9] .
In contrast, relatively little is known about non-interference for low-level languages, in particular because their lack of structure renders control flow more intricate; in fact many existing works, among which [10, 11] , use model-checking and abstract interpretation techniques to detect illegal information flows, but do not provide proofs of non-interference for programs that are accepted by their analysis.
The first part of this paper is devoted to the definition of an information flow type system for a low-level language with jumps and procedure calls, and to a proof that the type system enforces termination-insensitive non-interference. Informally, the security policy is expressed as a mapping Γ : X → S that assigns to each register a security level taken from {H, L}. As usual H denotes confidential data and L denotes public data, so registers x ∈ X such that Γ(x) = L correspond to the registers that are observable by the attacker. Then non-interference is expressed as:
ρ ∼ ρ and P, ρ ⇓ µ and P, ρ ⇓ µ imply µ ∼ µ where P, ρ ⇓ µ denotes that executing program P with initial memory ρ yields the final memory µ, and ρ ∼ ρ denotes that ρ and ρ coincide on all variables x ∈ X such that Γ(x) = L.
In order to enforce non-interference of programs, we follow the principles of Java bytecode ver-ification, see e.g. [12] , namely to provide an abstract transition relation between typed states, and to compute types through a dataflow analysis based on the abstract transition relation. The proof of soundness of the type system relies on a general method. Informally, we define a notion ∼ of L-equivalence between states; the idea is that two states are L-equivalent if they cannot be distinguished from one another by an attacker. Then, writing s ; u to denote that performing one-step execution from state s results in a new state u, we show that:
• if s ; s , and u ; u , and s ∼ s , and the program counters of s and u coincide, then u ∼ u ; furthermore, the program counters of s and u coincide, or the program counters of s and u belong to the control dependence region of a branching instruction that performs a test on confidential data;
• if the program counter of s belongs to the control dependence region of a branching instruction that performs a test on confidential data, and s ; u, then s ∼ u, and either the program counter of u remains in the control dependence region to which s belongs, or the program counter of u is the "exit" of this region.
By appealing to properties of control dependence regions, and by combining the two results in an adequate way, and appealing to transitivity of L-equivalence, one shows that typable programs are non-interfering.
The second part of this paper is devoted to proving that information flow types can be preserved by compilation. As suggested by Abadi [13] , information flow type systems for low-level languages should appropriately relate to their counterparts for high-level languages, and one would expect that compilation preserves information flow typing. Indeed, we show for a high-level language and an information flow type system that closely resemble those of [3] that compilation function preserves typing. The proof that compilation preserves typing proceeds by induction on the structure of derivations, and can be viewed as a procedure to compute, from a certificate of well-typing at the source program, another certificate of well-typing for the compiled program. It is thus very close in spirit to a certifying compiler [14] .
Contents
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the issue with noninterference in an assembly language. In Section 3 we define an assembly language that shall serve as the compiler target, endow it with an information flow type system, and prove that the type system is decidable and enforces termination-insensitive non-interference. In Section 5, we introduce a high-level imperative language with procedures and its associated type system. Furthermore, we introduce a compiler that we show to preserve information flow typing; we also show how typepreserving compilation can be used to lift non-interference to the high-level language. We conclude in Section 6, with related work and directions for further research.
Motivating examples
Any sound information flow type system for an assembly language must prevent information leakages through direct flows, as illustrated in Example 1 below, and through indirect flows, as illustrated in Examples 2-5 below.
Example 1 (Direct flows) Consider the following program, where x L is a low variable and y H is a high variable:
The first instruction pushes the value held in y H on top of the operand stack, while the second instruction stores the top of the operand stack in x L . Thus this program fragment stores in the variable x L the value held in the variable y H , and thus leaks information.
We avoid such information leakages by assigning a security level to each value in the operand stack, via a so-called stack type, and by rejecting programs that attempt storing a value in a low variable when the top of the stack type is high. By forcing the top of the stack type to high after executing the load instruction, the program is thus rejected.
Example 2 (Indirect flows via assignments) As is well-known for high-level languages, assignments within branching instructions may lead to information leakages. The following example demonstrates how information may be leaked through assignments within the scope of a branching instruction. Consider the following program, where x L is a low variable and y H is a high variable:
The program yields an implicit flow, as the final value of x L depends on the initial value of y H .
Indeed, the final value of x L is 0 if the initial value of y H is 0, and 1 otherwise. The problem is caused by an assignment to x L in the scope of an if instruction.
We avoid such information leakages by defining the scope of a branching instruction, and by requiring that no assignment to a low variable is performed within its scope if the control flow is influenced by a high variable. Technically, this is achieved by tracking for each program point the security level under which they execute, via a so-called security environment.
Example 3 (Indirect flows via abrupt termination) Abrupt termination in the scope of branching instructions may also cause information leakage. Consider the following program, where x L is a 1 The if n bytecode branches to n if the top of the operand stack is 0, and to the next instruction after if n otherwise. low variable and y H is a high variable:
Indeed, the final value of x L is 1 if the initial value of y H is 0, and 0 otherwise. The problem is caused by a return instruction in the scope of an if instruction.
We avoid such information leakages by constraining the use of return instructions in the scope of branching statements.
Furthermore, branching instructions may cause information leakage, even if there are no assignments to low variables or return instructions within their scope.
Example 4 (Indirect flows via operand stack) Consider the following program, where x L is a low variable and y H is a high variable:
The program yields an implicit flow, as the final value of x L depends on the initial value of y H . Indeed, the final value of x L is 3 if the initial value of y H is 0, and 4 otherwise. The problem is caused by an instruction that manipulates the operand stack in the scope of an if instruction (we use a store y H instruction but a pop instruction would have a similar effect).
We avoid such information leakages by lifting all elements of the stack type to high upon entering a branching instruction whose control flow is influenced by a high variable. Then the assignment to x L is not allowed, since the values 3 and 4 are tagged as H by the stack type.
Example 5 (Indirect flows via operand stack) Consider the following program, where x L is a low variable and y H is a high variable:
The program yields an implicit flow, as the final value of x L depends on the initial value of y H . Indeed, the final value of x L is 3 if the initial value of y H is 0, and 4 otherwise. The problem is caused by an arithmetic instruction that manipulates the operand stack in the scope of an if instruction.
We avoid such information leakages as in the previous example, i.e. through lifting the operand stack. 
Assembly Language
In this section we introduce a simple assembly language with jumps and procedures that is used in Section 5 as a target of our compiler.
Syntax of programs
Program are defined as a set of procedures, each of which consists of an array of instructions. Instructions are either branching instructions (both conditional and unconditional), arithmetic instructions, instructions to manipulate registers, or instructions to call and return from a procedure.
Formally, we assume given a finite set X of registers, and a finite set F of procedure names, with a distinguished procedure main ∈ F. In addition, we define the set V of values to be Z, and assume given a set AO ⊆ Z × Z → Z of arithmetic operations, and a set BO ⊆ Z × Z → {0, 1} of comparison operators. Then, we define the set Instr of instructions in Figure 1 , where op ∈ V ∪AO∪BO; f ranges over F, x ranges over X , and j ranges over N. Finally, we define a program P as an F-indexed set of procedures, with each procedure defined as an array of instructions. We let P f be the procedure associated to f , and P f [i] be the i-th instruction in P f .
Semantics
Program semantics are defined in terms of a small-step operational semantics which describes one step execution of programs. Formally, the operational semantics of programs is given as a transition relation between states. A state consists of a call string, which captures the current sequence of procedure calls, an operand stack, and a register map. In order to guarantee decidability of typechecking, we impose an upper bound both on the size of call strings, and on the size of operand stacks.
Definition 6 (Operational semantics) Let P be a program.
1. The set PP of programs points is the set of pairs f, i with f ∈ F, and i ∈ dom(P f ).
2. The set CS of call strings is the set of PP-stacks of length less than max.
3. The set RM of register maps is defined as X → V.
4. The set OS of operand stacks is defined as the set of V-stacks of length less than MAX.
5. The set state of states is defined as CS × RM × OS.
6. The operational semantics of the assembly language is given by the rules of Figure 2 ; we write ρ ⊕{x → v} to denote the unique function ρ s.t. ρ (y) = ρ(y) if y = x and ρ (x) = v. We let ; denote the reflexive-transitive closure of the relation ;. Note that all rules implicitly enforce the size requirements on call strings and operand stacks.
7. We write P, ρ ⇓ µ if main, 1 :: , ρ, ; , µ, , where denotes the empty stack.
Observe that procedure calls do not activate a new frame with its own local variables and operand stacks, as e.g. in the JVM; in fact, procedures are closer to JVM subroutines than they are to JVM method invocations.
Note that the operational semantics yields a successor relation →⊆ CS × CS, which is defined by the clauses:
: cs → f , j + 1 :: cs and furthermore f, i :: → ;
: f, i :: cs;
f, i :: cs, ρ, s ; f, i + 1 :: cs, ρ, n :: s
f, i :: cs, ρ, n 2 :: n 1 :: s ; f, i + 1 :: cs, ρ, n :: s It is easy to see that cs → cs for every states cs, ρ, s and cs , ρ , s such that cs, ρ, s ;
cs , ρ , s .
Control dependence regions
In order to prevent indirect flows, we must identify for every if instruction program points that execute under its control condition.
Definitions and properties
For the purpose of this paper, control dependence regions are treated axiomatically. That is, we define for every program P its set of conditional program points:
and assume given two functions:
that respectively compute the control dependence region of an if, and the junction point of the two branches of the if. While there exist algorithms to compute such regions in unstructured languages, see e.g. [15] , the soundness of the type system does not hinge on the exact computation of such control dependence regions. That is, the soundness of the type system does not rely on control dependence regions to be minimal in the sense that they only contain program points that indeed belong to the branch of the if. On the other hand, the minimality of control dependence regions and junction points (on compiled programs) is required to establish that compilation preserves typing, as in Theorem 16. Concretely, we establish soundness of the type system from the following assumptions:
Region inclusion property RIP: for every f, i , f , i ∈ PP if , such that f , i ∈ reg(f, i) we
Safe over approximation property SOAP: for every f, i ∈ PP if and execution path f, i :: cs, ρ, s ; cs 1 , ρ 1 , s 1 ; . . . ; cs n , ρ n , s n one of the following holds:
• there exists 1 ≤ l ≤ n such that cs l = jun(f, i) :: cs;
• there exists 1 ≤ l ≤ n such that cs l = f, j ::
We shall use the function reg in the type system, and the assumption about execution paths and jun in the proof of non-interference.
Remark The assumptions can be simplified to a great extent if we omit procedure calls. On the contrary, defining regions becomes more complex if JVM subroutines are adopted instead of procedure calls. See e.g. [16] for a brief discussion on these points.
Implementation and example
We have implemented (in Haskell) a simple algorithm to compute control dependence regions for our assembly language. The algorithm is based on the notion of dominators, classical in the literature (see e.g. [17] [p.379]). Roughly, a program point cs dominates another program point cs if everypath from (main, 1) to cs must go through cs. The algorithm to compute the region of a program point cs first calculates the set D cs of all the program points that are dominated by cs. Then, it proceeds as follows: let Succs be the set of all successors of cs, and cs ∈ Succs,
• If cs dominates all its own successors that are in D cs , then discard cs from Succs and iterate.
• If cs does not dominate all its own successors that are in D cs , then add cs to the region of cs and add all successors of cs that are in D cs to Succs \ {cs }, then iterate.
The program terminates when there are no more elements in Succs. The program always terminates since the set of program points of every program is finite, and the same element is not added twice to the set of Succs.
This algorithm for regions satisfies the SOAP property, but does not provide any guarantee w.r.t. the RIP property since it computes regions one by one. Given the set R of all the regions of a program P calculated by the algorithm above, it is possible to apply an algorithm to obtain regions for P s.t. its regions satisfy the RIP property. Such an algorithm should check that any two regions r 1 (p 1 ) and r 2 (p 2 ) in R are related by inclusion, whenever their intersection is not empty. If their intersection is not empty and one is not included in the other, then take the union of r 1 (p 1 ) and r 2 (p 2 ) and make the union the new region for program points p 1 and p 2 . However, we do not detail such an algorithm that enforces RIP since the algorithm given above is already sufficient for programs that are compiled with the compiler described in Section 5.2 (i.e. it enforces RIP for such programs).
Consider the following program:
Using the algorithm to compute regions described above, the region for instruction 2 of procedure Consider the following program:
Notice that in this program not only there are two branches depending of instruction 1 (as in a standard if in a high level language) but there is also a cycle produced by instruction 3, so instructions 4 and 5 depend on both instructions 1 and 3.
The region for instruction at 1 includes all program point of the form (main, i) where 2 ≤ i ≤ 6.
Instruction 3 does not dominate 1, therefore the region for 3 only includes program points (main, 4) and (main, 5). Thus this program satisfies the RIP property.
Non-interference for the assembly language
The purpose of this section is to define an information flow type system that enforces non-interference for programs of the assembly language. Although different notions of non-interference are applicable to our setting, we focus on so-called termination insensitive non-interference, which guarantees that two terminating program executions that start from initial states that are equivalent from the point of view of an attacker will terminate with final states that are also equivalent from the point of view of an attacker.
Defining non-interference
Non-interference is defined relative to a security policy Γ : X → S that assigns to each register a security level from the set S = {H, L}. As usual, we assume that L ≤ H. Note that we assume that the security level of a register is fixed throughout execution.
Definition 7 (Non-interfering program)
3. A program P is non-interfering, written NI Γ (P ), if for every register maps ρ, ρ , µ, µ : X → V, ρ ∼ Γ ρ and P, ρ ⇓ µ and P, ρ ⇓ µ imply µ ∼ Γ µ
There are at least two obvious directions in which the security policy could be generalized: first, by considering a lattice of security levels instead of the two-point set S, and second, by letting security levels of registers vary throughout execution. The first generalization would add technicalities without adding insight, whereas the second generalization is considered in [18] .
Note that the programs given in the introduction can easily been shown to be interfering.
Γ, cs k :: st, se ⇒ st, se cs = f, i :: cs P f [i] = prim n Γ, cs st, se ⇒ se(f, i) :: st, se cs = f, i ::
where
• denotes the lub of two security levels;
• lift k (st), where k ∈ S, denotes the pointwise extension to the stack type st of the function λl. k l;
• lift k (se, R), where k ∈ S, denotes the pointwise extension for all program points in R of the function λl. k l. 
Abstract transition system
The abstract transition system is given by transfer rules of the cs = f, i ::
where Γ is the security policy, st, st are stack types, i.e. stacks of security levels, and se, se are security environments, i.e. maps that assign a security level to each program point. The transfer rules impose some typing constraints on cs and its successors: more precisely, st, se determine typing constraints for cs, and st , se determine typing constraints for the successors of cs.
Definition 8 (Typed states)
1. The set ST of stack types is defined as the set of S-stacks of length less than max.
2. The set SE of security environments is defined as PP → S.
3. The set tstate of typed states is defined as ST × SE.
As mentioned above, the abstract transition system involves statements of the form Γ, cs st, se ⇒ st , se , where cs is a call string, and st, se and st , se are typed states.
Definition 9 (Typing transfer rules)
1. The abstract transition system is defined by the typing transfer rules in Figure 3 .
2. The relation Γ cs, st, se ⇒ cs , st , se is defined as Γ, cs st, se ⇒ st , se and cs → cs . We let Γ ·, ·, · ⇒ ·, ·, · be defined as the transitive closure of Γ ·, ·, · ⇒ ·, ·, ·.
As with the operational semantics, all rules implicitly enforce the size requirements on call strings and operand stacks.
We conclude this section by observing that the transfer function rules define a partial function,
i.e. Γ, cs st, se ⇒ st 1 , se 1 and Γ, cs st, se ⇒ st 2 , se 2 implies st 1 = st 2 and se 1 = se 2 .
Typing programs
Following the type systems for polyvariant subroutines in the JVM, see e.g. [19, 20, 12] , our type system assigns sets of typed states to each program point.
Definition 10 (Typable programs)
1. A security type is a map S : CS → ℘ (tstate). Given a security type S and a call string cs we let S cs denote S(cs).
2.
A typing judgment is a triple of the form Γ, S P , where Γ is the security policy under which the program P must be typed, and S is a security type.
3. The program P has type S (w.r.t. Γ), written Γ, S P , if Γ, S P can be derived from the typing rule:
∀cs, cs ∈ CS. ∀st, se ∈ S cs . cs → cs implies ∃st , se ∈ S cs . Γ, cs st, se ⇒ st , se Γ, S P 4. The program P is typable (w.r.t. Γ), written Γ P , if Γ, S P for some security type S.
It is possible to compute the type of a program, by using a dataflow analysis that explores abstract execution paths. The algorithm computes S as follows:
• initially, the call string main, 1 : is mapped to the typed state , λp.L ;
• next, the algorithm repeatedly performs the iterative step, i.e. selects one call string cs, and one typed state st, se ∈ S c s, then performs its abstract execution, i.e. computes the typed state st , se such that Γ, cs st, se ⇒ st , se , and adds st , se to all sets S cs where cs → cs .
In case the typed state st , se does not exist, the algorithm returns an error;
• finally, the algorithm terminates when for every call string cs, and typed state st, se ∈ S c s and typed state st , se such that Γ, cs st, se ⇒ st , se , we have st , se ∈ S cs for every cs ∈ CS such that cs → cs .
The algorithm terminates because the sets tstate and CS are finite, and because an auxiliary bitmap indicates on which call strings the algorithm must perform the iterative step. Furthermore, the algorithm returns an error, or computes a type for the program P .
Proposition 11
It is decidable whether a program P is typable.
Note that there are a number of variants and optimizations for computing the typing of programs, see e.g. [12] .
Examples
Before proving the soundness of the type system, we consider some examples of typable programs, and of non-typable programs. We start with the non-typable programs of Section 2:
• The first example (direct flow) is rejected by our type system. Indeed, the transition of an instruction store x L is restricted to the case where the type in the top of the stack type is low, whereas the instruction load y H pushes H on the stack type.
• The second and third examples (indirect flow) are rejected by our type system. Indeed, the transition of an instruction if l sets to H the security level of all program points in its control dependence region, whenever the type on the top of the stack type is H, which is the case after executing the load y H instruction. Then, the type system rejects low assignments that are performed at program points which are high w.r.t. the security environments, and return instructions occurring in the main procedure and moreover at program points which are high w.r.t. the security environments.
• The fourth and fifth examples (indirect flow via operand stack) are rejected by our type system. Indeed, the transition of an instruction if l sets to H the security level of all elements in the stack, whenever the type on the top of the stack type is H, which is the case after executing the load y H instruction. Then, the type system rejects assignments of high values to low registers. 
Soundness
Typable programs are non-interfering.
The idea of the proof is as follows: first, we prove in Lemma 14 that L-equivalence is preserved under one step of execution, if the program is typable. Second, we prove in Lemma 15 that one step execution in a high-level environment yields a result state that is L-equivalent to the original one.
By combining these results together, we conclude.
Defining L-equivalence between states
The statements of the main lemmas towards Theorem 12 rely on a notion of L-equivalence between states. This notion is defined in terms of L-equivalence between register maps, as defined in Definition 7, and of L-equivalence between operand stacks. In order for the proofs to go through in the case of high-level environments, the definition of L-equivalence between stacks requires a slight generalization of the pointwise order on stacks. The intuition is that we require operand stacks to be L-equivalent pointwise on some common top part, and then to be high in the bottom part on which they may not coincide.
Definition 13 (Operand stack and state L-equivalence)
1. Let st be a stack type. We write high st if st has length n and st[i] = H for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. 
Let
s ∧ ρ ∼ Γ ρ .
Soundness proof
In the sequel, we use s · cs to denote the call string of a state s.
The first lemma establishes that L-equivalence is preserved under one-step execution. Informally, if s ∼ s , and s ; u, and s ; u , then u ∼ u .
Lemma 14 (One-step non-interference in low-level environments) Suppose Γ, S P . Let • s 1 · cs = s 2 · cs;
• s 1 · cs = f, i :: cs and s 1 · cs = f , i :: cs and s 2 · cs = f , i :: cs and (f, i) ∈ PP if with (f , i ), (f , i ) ∈ reg(f, i), and se(f 1 , i 1 ) = H for all (f 1 , i 1 ) ∈ reg(f, i), and high st 1 and high st 2 .
Proof By a case analysis on the instruction that is executed.
The second lemma establishes that, in high-level environments, the execution relation is included in the L-equivalence relation. Informally, if s ; u, then s ∼ u.
Lemma 15 (One-Step non-interference in high-level environments) Suppose Γ, S P . Let s, s be states such that s ; s and assume s · cs = f, i :: cs 0 . Let (st, se) ∈ S s·cs be a security type
Then there exists (st , se) ∈ S s ·cs s.t. high st , and s ∼ Γ,st,st s , and Γ, s · cs (st, se) ⇒ (st , se).
Furthermore, one of the following holds:
• s · cs = f , i :: cs 0 with (f , i ) ∈ reg(f 0 , i 0 );
• s · cs = jun(f 0 , i 0 ) :: cs 0 .
Proof By a case analysis on the instruction that is executed. where s 0 = main, 1 :: , ρ, , and s 0 = main, 1 :: , ρ , , and s n1 · cs = s n2 · cs = .
By invoking Lemma 14 as long as it applies, we conclude for some maximal q that s q · cs = s q · cs, and that there exists (st q , se), (st q , se) ∈ S sq ·cs such that s q ∼ Γ,stq ,st q s q . Now there are two cases to treat: if s q · cs = then n 1 = n 2 = q and we are done; otherwise, the last instruction executed is an if high.
By the typing rule of the if instruction, we have high st q and high st q . We now invoke Lemma 15 repeatedly to conclude that there exists s q1 and s q2 and (st q1 , se 1 ) ∈ S sq 1 ·cs and (st q2 , se 2 ) ∈ S s q 2 ·cs such that s q ∼ Γ,stq,stq 1 s q1 and s q ∼ Γ,st q ,st q 2 s q2 . By transitivity, we conclude s q1 ∼ Γ,stq 1 ,st q 2 s q2 .
Further, we can choose q 1 and q 2 to be the minimal indexes such that s q1 · cs = jun(f, i) :: cs and s q2 ·cs = jun(f, i) :: cs respectively. As Γ s q ·cs, st q , se ⇒ s q1 ·cs, st q1 , se 1 and Γ s q ·cs, st q , se ⇒ s q2 · cs, st q2 , se 2 and only if statements may modify the security environment, and we assume RIP, we can further conclude that se 1 = se 2 .
Thus we can apply Lemma 14 again, and repeat the process until reaching the final states of the reduction sequences.
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In this section, we define a high-level imperative language, equippe it with a security type system, and introduce a compiler from the source language to the assembly language. Then we show that the compiler preserves security types, and derive as a corollary that the security type system for the source language enforces non-interference.
Source language
The source language is a simple imperative language with procedures. A procedure is a declaration of the form proc f ( x) = c; return where f is a procedure name and c is a command. As with the assembly language, we assume that a program is a list of procedures with a distinguished, main, procedure without parameters. Formally, the set Expr of expressions, Comm of commands, and Prog of programs are given by the following syntaxes:
e ::= x | n | e op e c ::= x := e | f ( e) | c; c | while e do c | if e then c else c
The operational, big-step semantics of programs is based on judgments of the form c, µ ⇓ µ , where c ∈ Comm and µ, µ : X → V. Rules are standard, see e.g. [21, 3] , and omitted. We write P, µ ⇓ µ iff c main , µ ⇓ µ , where c main is the body of the main procedure.
The security type system is based on judgments of the form Γ e : τ and Γ c : τ cmd. A program P is typable, written Γ P , if Γ c main : τ cmd for some τ . The typing rules are inspired from [21, 3] , and are given in Figure 4 ; in the last rule, we assume that the procedure f is defined by proc f ( x) = P ; return.
Note that the typing rules exclude mutual and self-recursion; however it is possible to overcome this limitation at the price of further technicalities.
Compilation
The compilation function C p is defined in the usual way from a compilation function on expressions C e : Expr → Instr , and a compilation function on commands C c : Comm → Instr . Their formal definitions are given in Figure 5 . In order to enhance readability, we use :: both for concatenating an element to a list and concatenating two lists, and #l to denote the length of the list l. Furthermore we omit details of calculating pc in the clauses for while and if expressions.
Preservation of security types
In this section, we assume that regions used by the type system of the assembly language are minimal in the sense that the region of the compilation of an if instruction compiled from a command if e then c 1 else c 2 , includes exactly those program points belonging to the compilation of c 1 and c 2 .
Similarly, the region of the compilation of an if instruction compiled from a command while e do c includes exactly those program points belonging to the compilation of c. We need these minimal regions to show that compilation preserves typing.
The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we show how to compute from an expression in the source language and its type, the type of the corresponding compiled code produced by the function C e .
By abuse of notation, we write se = τ if se(f, j) = τ for every f, j ∈ PP.
Lemma 17 Assume e is an expression in P and Γ e : τ , and
. For every cs 0 ∈ CS and st, se ∈ ST s.t. se = τ , there exists S e cs0,st,se : { f, k :: cs 0 | i ≤ k ≤ j + 1} → ST -by abuse of notation, we often write S e -s.t.:
1. for every cs, cs ∈ dom(S e ), if cs → cs then Γ, cs S e (cs) ⇒ S e (cs );
2. S e ( f, j + 1 :: cs 0 ) = τ :: st, se.
Proof By structural induction on instructions.
Second, we extend the result to commands.
Lemma 18
Assume c is a command in P , and Γ c : τ cmd, and 1. for every cs, cs ∈ dom(S c ) and st, se ∈ S c (cs) s.t. cs → cs , there exists st , se ∈ S c (cs ) s.t.
Γ, cs st, se ⇒ st , se ;
2. there exists st s.t. st = st 0 or st = lift H st 0 , and for every cs ∈ dom(S c ), cs ∈ dom(S c )
and st, se ∈ S c (cs) s.t. cs → cs , Γ, cs st, se ⇒ st , se for se = lift H (se 0 , reg(f, i)) for some f, i or se = se 0 .
Proof [of Theorem 16] Set se 0 = L. By construction, the function S cmain main,1 : , ,se0 is defined for all cs s.t. main, 1 : → cs. It is then immediate to conclude.
Recovering non-interference for the source language
One can also prove that compilation preserves operational semantics.
Proposition 19 (Preservation of semantics) For every program P and memories
Proof Routine and omitted.
By combining Proposition 19 and Theorem 16 we are able to recover the non-interference result for typable source programs.
Corollary 20 (Non-interference for source language) Let P be a program, let Γ : X → S and assume that Γ P . Then P is non-interfering w.r.t. Γ in the sense that for every ρ, ρ , µ, µ : X → V such that ρ ∼ Γ ρ and P, ρ ⇓ µ, and P, ρ ⇓ µ , we have µ ∼ Γ µ .
Proof By Proposition 19, C p (P ), ρ ⇓ µ and C p (P ), ρ ⇓ µ . Furthermore Γ C p (P ) by Theorem 16. Hence C p (P ) is non-interfering w.r.t. Γ by Theorem 12, and thus µ ∼ Γ µ by definition of non-interference.
Example 21
In this example the typing is done at source code for a program P level using the type system in Figure 4 .
The compilation using C p in Figure 5 is shown, as well as computation of its type, using the typing transfer rules of Figure 3 
It is left to the reader to check that the type obtained by using the type system for the assembly language is the same type obtained using the implicit algorithm in the proof of Theorem 16.
Conclusion
We have shown how type systems can be used to enforce non-interference in a low-level language with procedures, and that one can define a security types preserving compiler from a high-level imperative language to such a low-level language.
Related work
As emphasized in the introduction, static enforcement of non-interference through type systems is a well-researched topic, see e.g. [1] for a survey. We only comment on some of the most relevant literature.
Low-level languages Lanet et al., see e.g. [11] , develop a method to detect illicit flows for a sequential fragment of the JVM. In a nutshell, they proceed by specifying in the SMV model checker a symbolic transition semantics of the JVM that manipulates security levels, and by verifying that an invariant that captures the absence of illicit flows is maintained throughout the (abstract) program execution. Their analysis is more flexible than ours, in that it accepts programs such as Mendel [22] have considered non-interference for a simple assembly language, using linear continuations for computing control dependence regions. Their proof technique is similar to ours. Using abstract interpretation techniques, Genaim and Spoto [23] have also developed a sound information flow analysis for a fragment of Java bytecode. Finally, the first and third author [16] have developed a sound information flow type system for a large fragment of the JVM.
Type preserving compilation Type preserving compilation has been thoroughly studied in the context of typed intermediate languages, most notably for ML and Java, see e.g. [24] . Information flow types preserving compilation has been studied by Zwandewic and Myers in the context of λ-calculus and CPS translation [25] . Also, Honda and Yoshida [5] consider type-preserving interpretations of higher-order imperative calculi with security types to π-calculus with security types.
Proof Carrying Code and Typed Assembly Languages Recent work on Proof Carrying
Code [14, 26] advocates the use of certifying compilation, which is closely related to type preserving compilation in the sense that a certifying compiler aims at producing, from a certificate (i.e. a proof object) that a source program adheres to a property, a certificate that the compiled program adheres to a corresponding property.
Recent work on typed assembly languages [27] aims at endowing assembly languages with a typing system which guarantees such properties as memory safety of programs.
Future work
Our work constitutes a preliminary investigation in the realm of certifying compilation for security properties, and may be extended in several directions.
• Language expressiveness: we would like to extend the results of this paper to more powerful languages that include objects and/or higher-order functions. We are particularly interested in scaling up our results to the sequential fragment of Java and of the JVM, building up on [7] for the former and on [16] for the latter.
• Integrity: it should be possible, and of practical interest, to adapt our results to integrity.
Indeed, weak forms of integrity guarantee that high variables may not be modified by a low writer, and are dual to confidentiality.
• Machine-checked proofs: we would like to machine-check the proof of soundness of the information flow type system of Section 4 and of [16] . Using earlier work on verified bytecode verifiers [28] in Coq [29] (see [30] for similar earlier work in Isabelle [31] ), it should be possible to derive a certified bytecode verifier that guarantees secure information flow for a representative (sequential) fragment of the JVM.
A Proof of Lemmas 14 and 15
In the sequel, we use hd and tl to denote the head and tail functions. 
By the typing transfer rule,
By the operational semantics,
. There are two cases to treat:
• if se(f, i) ≤ Γ(x) then Γ(x) se(f, i) = Γ(x) and we are done by hypothesis.
• if se(f, i) > Γ(x) then Γ(x) se(f, i) = H and ρ 1 (x) ∼ H ρ 2 (x) holds by definition.
By the operational semantics, where l ∈ {i + 1, j}. Clearly s ∼ Γ,st,st s and high st , as we assume that either high st or
The remaining instructions are similar or straightforward.
B Proof of Theorem 16
Throughout this section, we assume given a fixed program P ∈ P and a fixed register type Γ : X → S.
Proof [of Lemma 17] By structural induction on instructions.
Case: e ≡ x. By definition, we have that C e (e) = load x and i = j. Define S e such that S e ( f, i ::
cs 0 ) = st, se and such that S e ( f, i + 1 :: cs 0 ) is equal to (Γ(x) se(f, i)) :: st, se. Properties 1 and 2 hold by the transfer rule of load, and because Γ(x) se(f, i) = τ as se(f, i) = τ and Γ(x) ≤ τ as Γ e : τ .
Case: e ≡ n. By definition, C e (e) = prim n and i = j. Define S e such that, S e ( f, i :: cs 0 ) = st, se
and S e ( f, i + 1 :: cs 0 ) = se(f, i) :: st, se. Properties 1 and 2 hold by the rule of prim, and because se(f, i) = τ .
Case: e ≡ e 1 op e 2 . By definition, C e (e) = C e (e 1 ) :: C e (e 2 ) :: prim op. Now assume that P f [i . In the sequel, we use ∪ to denote the union of two partial maps that coincide on the intersection of their domains. By abuse of notation, we write S The relation is well-founded, as the type system excludes mutual or self-recursion, so we proceed by well-founded induction on .
Case: c ≡ x := e. By definition, C c (c) = C e (e) · store x. Set S c = S e cs0,st0,se0 , where S e cs0,st0,se0 is defined using Lemma 17 (which can be applied because the command in the source language is typable). As S e cs0,st0,se0 satisfies both properties 1 and 2 of Lemma 17, we can conclude. The only subtlety is to notice that S c cs0,st0,se0 ( f, j + 1 :: cs 0 ) is equal to {τ :: st 0 , se 0 }, which follows from Lemma 17. 
